Kalliereo

    Original publication: "Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greece" database (http://www.sacrificium.filg.uj.edu.pl).

    Authors: Przemysław Biernat (2016-03-07: written contents); Przemysław Biernat (2018-02-17: updated document contents); Irene Vagionakis (2022-02-03: encoded in XML)

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    καλλιερέω kalliereo, v. abs.: to procure signs of acceptance of the sacrifice by the gods while making it. trans.: to make an offering [acc.] accepted by the gods, pleasing to the gods.

    Etymology and morphology

    A compound verb, formed from the expression καλὰ ἱερά, 'beautiful offerings, scil. offerings pleasing to the gods' (Beekes 2010: 625). The form kalli- instead of kali- is frequent in the compound, although it has not received a satisfactory explanation (Chantraine 1968: 486, Beekes 2010: 627).

    Trace attested are two derivations from the verb κ.: καλλιέρησις, 'to acquire a sign of acceptance of sacrifices' (IG I2.98.23, Onas. 10.26), and καλλιέρημα, "a sacrifice accepted by the gods" (Hsch. s.v. καλλιέρημα, EM. 487.14).

    Certificates

    Significance and usage

    In absolute usage (without complements) the meaning of the verb κ. is synonymous with the expression καλὰ τὰ ἱερὰ εἶναι / γίγνεσθαι (see interchangeable usage in Aeschin. 3 131, D. Prooem. 54.1). Thus, he does not describe the act of offering the sacrifice (θύω), but sums it up by indicating that it was accepted by the gods (δέχομαι, Plu. Quaes. Conv. 632d). In (rarer) transitive usage, the verb κ. denotes the offering of a sacrifice (expressed by a proximal complement) and indicates that the sacrifice was accepted by the gods (or that it was offered with that intention; D. 21.53, Theoc. 5.148, Plu. Alex. 69.4, An Viti. 3; Greg.Naz. C. 726.13). The best attested method for finding out whether the gods accepted the sacrifice was to inspect the entrails of the sacrificed animal (cf. D.S. 14.80).

    The verb κ. may occur with the preposition ὑπέρ, indicating the group or undertaking for whose intention(s) the sacrifice is made (hυπὲρ τε͂ς ἀποικίας, IG I3 46 (http://epigraphy.packhum.org/text/46?hs=417-425).9; ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου, IG II2 1006.26; ὑπὲρ τῆς (...) εὐδ[ο]ξίας τε καὶ σ[ω]τηρίας, IG II2 1224 (http://epigraphy.packhum.org /text/3439?hs=2853-2860). 13-14; ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας, Plu. An Viti. 3).

    On inscriptions commemorating the offering of sacrifices, the verbs κ. and θύω may be used side by side in reference to a single sacrifice, which serves to emphasize that the sacrifice was not only offered but also that it was pleasing to the gods, which must have been important from the point of view of the offering community (θύοντες καὶ καλλιεροῦντες, IG II2 1006.26; similarly IG II2 1008, IG II2 1028, IG II2 1029, IG II2 1030, IG II2 1039, IG II2 1043, IG II2 1224 and others; cf. also Plb. 32.15).

    When καλλιερεῖν?

    The ascription of a semiotic character to the sacrifice translated into its use in decision-making (see Flower's general remarks on divination, 2008: 74-76, Park 1963). Most often, the sacrifice was offered to see if the gods would give their consent or promise their support in the undertaking whose undertaking the sacrifice was accompanying (marching of troops, starting a battle, founding a colony, private initiative, etc.). Acceptance of the sacrifice meant consent/support, rejection of the sacrifice meant lack of consent/support (cf Hdt. 6.76).

    Most of the testimony concerning the interpretation of sacrifices comes from descriptions of warfare (see Sloth 2012), and we can see from them that making sacrifices at the time was a compromise between the need to make decisions and the knowledge that in an undertaking as risky as war, one must know that one has the gods on one's side (ἀνάγκη καλλιερεῖν, Onas. 10.27). Commanders made sacrifices because they wanted to know if the moment was right to roll up camp, cross a river or attack enemy positions (Hdt. 6.76, 9.19, 9.38; X. An. 5.4.22, Cyr. 6.4.12, Hel. 6.5.17; neglect of procedure: Aeschin. 3.131, Plu. Cam. 18.4). If casualties were unsuccessful, plans were changed (Hdt. 6.76, D.S. 14.80) or another sacrifice was made the next day (Hdt. 9.93; X. An. 7.1.40, Hel. 3.1.17; Non-military context: X. Vect. 6). The ineffective sacrifice may have lasted up to several days.

    Sometimes from the sources a picture emerges of a commander who had not received a sign of favour from the gods, but was determined to take the intended action. He would then kill another animal, followed by another, until the result was achieved. An example of this attitude is found in the description of the uphill struggle between the troops of Agesilaos and Pharnabazos in the Hellenics (X. Hel. 4.1.22): when one of the Spartan commanders learns where the men of Pharnabazos are camped, he asks Agesilaos to assign him soldiers and allow him to organise an outing; he then offers sacrifices and only interrupts them towards evening, when he finally manages to receive a sign of favour, After which he calls the soldiers to march (cf. also: X. Cyr. 1.5.6; Plu. Arist. 17, Aem. 17; continuous sacrifice as, apparently, an attempt to turn the tide of battle: Hdt. 7.167; continuous sacrifice in a non-military context: X. Hel. 3.3.4). We do not know how the Greeks rationalised such behaviour for themselves, but it is likely that they saw such offerings as propitiatory and the gods' change of mind as yielding to the request (cf. Sloth 2012: 24). For Greek intellectuals, such reasoning may have been difficult to accept because it would have undermined the moral perfection of the gods. According to Onasander, the gods, by accepting the sacrifice, indicated to the commander the right moment to take a given action. One should therefore not do anything without having made the sacrifice in advance, and one should repeat it on the same day (θύεσθαι δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας πολλάκις) so long as the gods did not accept it, because starting an action too early (without the gods' approval) or too late (receiving approval the next day) could ruin the whole enterprise (Onasander 10.27). In this way Onasander avoided the suspicion that sacrificing in war serves to gain (buy) the favor of the gods (the view that the gods can be bought with sacrifices was criticized, among other things, by Plato in the State - a dialogue. by Plato in the State, a dialogue to which Onasander was to write a commentary, see Suda on 386).

    How καλλιερεῖν?

    Probably the whole process of burning the parts of the sacrificial animal intended for the gods was semiotic in nature (cf. ἐμπύρων φλόγα, E. Supp. 155; Hel. 746).

    In the literary description of the rejected sacrifice in → Sophocles' Antigone (1005-1020), the fire does not burn as it should and the bile splashes on all sides. Tiresias describes these sacrifices as ἄσημα (1113), i.e. devoid of signs, and on this basis concludes that the gods did not accept (οὐ δέχονται, 1119) the sacrifices. The sign of acceptance of the sacrifice could thus simply have been its standard, uninterrupted course (this is also probably the sense of the verb κ. in Plu. Quaes. Conv. 2.1; cf. τὰ ἱερὰ μὴ γίγνεσθαι τὰ νομιζόμενα, Antiph. 5.82).

    A far better attested method of communicating with the gods was to observe how the crossbone with its tail (the whole was referred to as ὀσφύς) behaved when burned on the altar. We know from iconographic representations and the reference in → Aristophanes' Peace (1054-5) that the tail (κέρκος) was supposed to bend upwards as a sign of the gods' favourable acceptance of the sacrificial gift (Van Straten 1966, Van Straten 1995: 118-134, Ekroth 2009). During reconstructions carried out today, several dozen sacrificial portions were burnt and each time the tail behaved in the same way, signifying the gods' acceptance of the sacrifice (oxtails: Jameson 1966; pig tails: Ekroth 2009: 143; lamb tails: Morton 2015). It seems, therefore, that only exceptionally did the gods signal their rejection of sacrifice in this way.

    The last relatively well-known method of sacrificial divination that had to do with obtaining information about the acceptance of sacrifices by the gods is the inspection of the entrails of the sacrificial animal (hieroscopy; see Collins 2008; Furley, Gysembergh 2015; scholia in Ar. Vesp. 831). Undeveloped internal organs or visible lesions could have been interpreted as a sign of rejection of the sacrifice by the gods (por. A. Prom. 493-495; X. An. 2.1.9 and 2.2.3; ), However, in many cases where the sources mention acts of hieroposition explicitly, the result is not the knowledge of acceptance or rejection of the victims (pace Naiden 2013: 341-342), but the disclosure (φαίνειν, φαίνεσθαι) of some threat that had hitherto remained hidden (X. An. 5.6.16-29: the victims are accepted, but the soothsayer sees the ruse; An. 7.8.1-5 and Hel. 3.3.4: hieroscopy and kallierh serve two different purposes; Hel. 4.7.7: the offering was made with the intention of building the wall, but as a result of the hierophant, the decision was made to leave the camp; E. El. 826-829). Living in the 1st century AD. Onasander (10.25-28) even believed that offering sacrifices before making a decision and hiero-scopy had different purposes: sacrifices should be offered to know the right moment to act, while hiero-scopy allows one to know the movements of the heavenly bodies that influence events on earth. This view may not be very representative of earlier eras.

    It seems that not every sacrifice was made with the intention of obtaining information about its acceptance or rejection by the gods. This is indicated by the use of the verb κ. in the "System of Athens" attributed to Aristotle (Ath. 54; cf. also Ar. Pl. 1181): κληροῖ δὲ καὶ ἱεροποιοὺς δέκα (...) οἳ τά τε μαντευτὰ ἱερὰ θύουσιν, κἄν τι καλλιερῆσαι δέῃ, καλλιεροῦσι μετὰ τῶν μάντεων ("Ten hieropoi were also chosen, who offered sacrifices commissioned by the oracle, and if something had to be offered by obtaining signs of favour, they offered in company with the soothsayers"; cf. sacrifices recommended by oracles cited by Demosthenes, 21.53, 43.66 - in both cases the oracle required that the sacrifices be accepted by the gods; otherwise the text of the "System of Athens" was understood by Phocius, s.v. Ἱεροποιοί; see also Rhodes' commentary, 1981: 605-606). The presence of manteis at the sacrifices suggests that the acquisition of signs was to be by hieroposition.

    So it seems that in the sources we come across traces of two interlocking divination practices, whose common denominator was the inspection of the entrails of the slain animal. The first is the ability to read information about the acceptance or rejection of a sacrifice by the gods (through observation of burnt offerings and inspection of the entrails, cf. E. Supp. 155). It does not seem to require any particular technical knowledge: Onasander explicitly states that the interpretation of signs during sacrifices can be learned very quickly (Onas. 10.25; cf. ἐμὲ οὐκ ἄπειρον ὄντα διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ παρεῖναι τοῖς ἱεροῖς, X. An. 5.6.29). The second skill relates to obtaining additional information, not provided for in the initial "enquiry form", by means of hieroscopy. Thus, the soothsayer, a specialist in technical hiero-scopy, could claim to be a specialist in sacrifices in general. Indeed, in the scene from Aristophanes' The Room already referred to, the exclusive nature of the soothsayers' competence is challenged by the chorus and Trigaios (1026-1030). At the same time, we know from the accounts of historians that the manteis were held in high esteem and highly regarded for their skills, especially in war. Perhaps we should not attach particular importance to this contradiction and treat it as a manifestation of the tension existing between religious specialists and non-specialists, also known from other eras and cultural circles - it was in the interest of specialists to convince everyone of their inalienability, which was sometimes undermined.

    Burnt sacrifice versus καλλιερεῖν

    Were the Greeks acquiring signs of the gods' acceptance of sacrifices during burnt offerings, during which no osphys were burned to the gods or hieroscopia was practiced? One argument for this thesis is a passus from the Anabasis in which we read of Xenophon that ἐθύετο καὶ ὡλοκαύτει χοίρους τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ, καὶ ἐκαλλιέρει (An. 7.8.4-5). That θύεσθαι and ὁλοκαυτεῖν do not refer to two different sacrifices (pace Ekroth 2002: 224) is supported by the analogous expression we find in → Plato's Kritias: θύσαντες καθαγίζοιεν πάντα τοῦ ταύρου τὰ μέλη (120a). In both cases θύω denotes the very act of killing an animal for a deity, and the next segment indicates the form the sacrifice took - a burnt offering.

    With the derivation of signs from the burnt offering we also have to do in the description of the self-immolation of the Hindu Kalanos (Plu. Alex. 69.4). It is difficult to determine to what extent this fictional scene of self-immolation of a non-Greek was modelled on the actual course of the Greek holocaust from animals. The fact is that Plutarch's description begins like that of a Greek animal sacrifice, except that the sacrificer is also the sacrificed: Kalanos sprays himself with water and throws a tuft of his hair into the fire (κατασπείσας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν τριχῶν ἀπαρξάμενος, Alex. 69.3). The favourable signs Kalanos obtained were because he did not move when the flames engulfed his body. Perhaps we should think that also during animal holocausts the behaviour of a carcass digested by fire was observed - if nothing unusual happened to it, it meant that the sacrifice was pleasing to the gods.

    Catalogue of appearances

    V-IV century BC

    Hdt. 6.76, 6.82, 7.113, 7.134, 7.167, 9.19, 9.38, 9.93, 9.96; Isoc. 14 60; Pl.Com. fr. 51 Kassel-Austin (= Ath. 15.19); Ar. Pl. 1181; Pl. Lg. 7.791a; X. An. 5.4.22, 7.1.40, 7.8, Cyr. 1.5.6, 6.4.12, Hel. 3.1.17, 3.1.19, 3.3, 4.1.22, 6.5.17, Eq. Mag. 3, Lac. 12.7, 13.2-3, Vect.6; Aeschin. 3 131; Arist. Ath. 54; D. 21 53, 43 66, Prooem. 54.1; Men. apud Ath. 8.67;

    III-I century BC

    Theoc. 5.148; Plb. 3.11, 32.15; D.S. 1.70.9, 4.24.4, 4.27.3, 14.80; Str. 8.7;

    I-II century AD

    J. AJ 8.108, 9.268, 9.271, 10.64, 12.146, BJ 7.155; Plu. Aem. 17, Arist. 17, Demetr. 13, Cam. 18.4, Quaes. Rom. 4, An Viti. 3, Quaes. Conv. 2.1; Onas. 10.27; App. BC 2.16.116; Lucianus, Demon. 11, Sat. 1.1; Paus. 9.13;

    III-IV century AD

    Clem.Al., Protr. 3.42.2., 3.42.8; Ach.Tat. 2.12; Greg.Naz. C. 726.13.

    Bibliography:

    Beekes, R. 2010. Etymological Dictionary of Greek. Leiden-Boston. Chantraine, P. 1968. Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Paris.

    Collins, D. 2008. Mapping the Entrails: the Practice of Greek Hepatoscopy. American Journal of Philology 129: 319-345.

    Ekroth, G. 2002. The Sacrificial Rituals of Greek Hero-Cults in the Archaic to Early Hellenistic Period. Kernos, Supplément 12. Liège.

    Ekroth, G. 2009. Thighs or tails? The osteological evidence as a source for Greek ritual norms. La norme en matière religieuse. Kernos supplément 21: 125-151.

    Flower, M. 2008. The Seer in Ancient Greece. Berkeley.

    Furley, W., Gysembergh V. 2015. Reading the Liver. Papyrological Texts on Ancient Greek Extispicy. Tübingen.

    Halliday, William R. 1913. Greek Divination. London.

    Jameson, M. H. 1966. The Omen of the Oxtail. Scientific American 214: 54.

    Morton, J. 2015. The Experience of Greek Sacrifice. Margaret M. Miles (ed.), Autopsy in Athens: Recent Archaeological Research on Athens and Attica: 66-75. Oxford.

    Park, George K. 1963. Divination and its Social Contexts. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 93: 195-209.

    Rhodes, P. J. 1981. A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia. Oxford.

    Sloth, Lea 2012. Divination as a Convention of War in Classical Greece. Classica et Mediaevalia 63: 5-31.

    van Straten, F. T. 1966. The God’s Portion in Greek Sacrificial Representations. R. Hägg, N. Marinatos and G. C. Nordquist (ed.), Early Greek Cult Practice: 51-68. Stockholm.

    van Straten, F. T. 1995. Hierà Kalá: Images of Animal Sacrifice in Archaic and Classical Greece. Leiden.


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